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SUBJECT MATTER AND APPELLATE JURISDICTION
This is an appeal in a criminal proceedings from a Judgment and Order and
conviction entered by the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, State of
Utah, Judge Ray Harding Sr. The Appellant, Danny Bryan, was sentenced to probation
by Judge Ray Harding Sr. for the criminal offense for a Second Degree Felony offense.
Statutory authority exists for this Appeal based upon the Rule 3(a) and 4(a) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure. There are no prior appeals. However, a related appeal in
State v. Debra Bryan, the Defendant's co-defendant and wife (990953-CA).
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW THE STANDARD
OF APPELLATE REVIEW WITH SUPPORTING AUTHORITY
AND CITATIONS
ISSUE: The State Was Prejudicedby the Error and Prosecutorial Misconduct Which Denied
the Appellant a Fair Trial
Standard of review: Whether the trial court erred in not giving a instruction to the jury
is a question of law which we review for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's
Conclusions. State v. Brooks, 849 P.2d 640, 643 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943
(Utah 1993).
Citation to Record: After the jury was excused for deliberations, the Appellant
renewed the Motion for New Trial and Mistrial based upon the prosecutorial error that
occurred during trial because of the mention of drug dealing. Counsel added to the Motion
the fact that during the closing arguments counsel for the State made two prejudiced remarks
that were related to the incident. First, the prosecutor referred to the residence during the
closing argument as "drug house". Secondly, in the final argument counsel for the defense
noted that the prosecutor stated that the Defendants are "drug dealers". (Tr. 188) Counsel
argued that this additional unfairly prejudicial evidence would be on the scope of argument
and connected the thread of the inflammatory prejudicial material which the State had
introduced earlier concerning drug deals at the residence. (Tr. 189)
ISSUE: the State Provoked the Mistrial and a Retrial Is Prohibited by Utah Constitution
Article I, Section 12 and Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
Standard of review :"VMZ propriety of a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion
2

to dismiss is a question of law that we review for correctness." Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500,
502 (Utah 1996).
Citation to Record: After the jury returned with the verdict the Court indicated that
the Courts still had Motions under advisement and was going to continue to do that for a time
pending a filing of a written Motion and Memorandum. (Tr. 192)
Issue:

The appellant was prejudiced by the error and prosecutorial misconduct which

denied the appellant a fair trial
Standard ofReview: The appellate court reverse a criminal conviction for insufficient
evidence only when the evidence is so inconclusive or so inherently improbable that
"reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt" that the defendant committed
the crime. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), superseded by rule on other
grounds, State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987).
Citation to Record: The counsel for the Appellant renewed the Motion for Mistrial
at the close of the State's evidence and moved to dismiss because jeopardy attached based
upon the misconduct of the State. Counsel for the Appellant noted at the conclusion of the
case that the evidence was entirely circumstantial based solely upon constructive possession
in a residence of non exclusive occupancy. The attorney for the Appellant then reviewed the
evidence noting that the States theory was based upon proximity of a room located near the
attic where the drugs were located the Appellant participation was minimal and there was
more incriminating evidence against the other occupants some of whom had possession of
syringes. (Tr. 124) The Court took the Motion under advisement and did not rule upon it.
3

(Tr. 127) The Appellant then renewed the Motion for Mistrial based upon the inadmissible
statement about a drug transaction in light of the purely circumstantial evidence of
constructed possession. (Tr. 127) The Court indicated in denying the Motion for Mistrial
based upon the statement noting ihe Court was surprised by the answer which was received.
(Tr. 129)
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES,
AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS
DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL
Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct;
exceptions; other crimes.
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is
not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an accused, or
by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character
trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut
evidence that the victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in Rules 607,
608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. In other words,
evidence offered under this rule is admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and
meets the requirements of Rules 402 and 403.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
Provisions of this rule apply to character evidence to prove conduct, as distinguished from proof of
character where character is an essential element of a charge, claim or defense As to the latter, see
4

Rule 405(b) See also Advisory Committee Note to Rule 404, Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 47,
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) was comparable See also State v Day, 572 P 2d 703 (Utah 1977)
(character evidence as to the character of the victim of a homicide was admissible to rebut the
defendant's contention that the deceased was the aggressor) One significant difference between this
rule and Rule 47, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) is that there is no provision for the use of character
evidence in civil cases, except where character is the ultimate issue in question, whereas Rule 47
authorized the use of character evidence in civil cases not only on the ultimate issue but where
otherwise substantively relevant See Boyce, Character Evidence The Substantive Use, 4 Utah Bar
J 13,18-19(1976) However, Rule 48, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) expressly excluded character
evidence with respect to a trait as to care or skill The Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of
Evidence concluded that the remaining justification for the admission of character evidence was so
insignificant that character evidence in civil cases should not be admitted unless it was in issue
Subdivision (b) is comparable to Rule 55, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) State v Forsyth, 641 P 2d
1172 (Utah 1982) See Boyce, Evidence of Other Crimes or Wrongdoing, 5 Utah Bar J 31 (1977)
The 1998 amendment abandons the additional requirements for admitting evidence under Rule 404(b)
imposed by State v Doporto, 935 P 2d 484 (Utah 1997) It clarifies that evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts, offered under 404(b), is admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and
meets the requirement of Rules 402 and 403
Utah's existing Rule 404 is otherwise identical to Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 404 and the
equivalent rule in most other states This amendment to the rule is not intended to depart from the
meaning and interpretation given to the equivalent rule in other jurisdictions, but to return to the
traditional application of Rule 404 prior to Doporto
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, "nor shall any
person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S.
Constitution. Amendment V. Similarly, the Utah Constitution provides, "nor shall any person
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." Utah Constitution. Art. I Section(s) 12
"'guarantee assures that, with certain exceptions, an individual will not be forced to endure
the strain, embarrassment, anxiety and expense of a [second] criminal trial' for the same
offense."
Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 2 4 Motion for new trial.
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant a new trial in the
interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect
upon the rights of a party.
5

(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The motion shall be
accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in support of the motion. If
additional time is required to procure affidavits or evidence the court may postpone the
hearing on the motion for such time as it deems reasonable.
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days after imposition of sentence, or
within such further time as the court may fix during the ten-day period.
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no trial had been held
and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned either in evidence or in argument.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a criminal prosecution based upon a felony information charging the
Defendant and his wife drug charges stemming out the search of their resident. The charges
involve possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, a First Degree Felony,
possession of controlled substance, a Class A Misdemeanor and Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Defendant plead not guilty and a jury trial was held before the Court. A jury
trial a verdict was entered of guilty to a First Degree Felony. Thereafter, the Defendant filed
a Motion pursuant to the Eight Amendment to reduce the charges to a Second Degree Felony
which was granted by the Court.
DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW
The Defendants were sentenced by the Court (see copy of the Judgement which is set
forth in the Appendix) and filed a Motion for a New Trial and the Motion for New Trial was
denied. The Defendants are presently on probation for the offenses in Utah County, State
6

of Utah.
STATEMENTS OF FACTS
1. The first witness called by the State was Steve Adams, a Spanish Fork Law
Enforcement Officer in charge of the executing a Search Warrant issued by the Fourth
District Court on the residence located at 88 North 700 East, Spanish Fork, Utah. (Tr. 18)
(Note: Transcript is located at R 000-0335, but pages or record are not record stamped)
2. Officer Steve Adams first testified that he was employed with the Spanish Fork
Police Department on May 11, 1997. Then the prosecutor began asking him a series of
questions concerning information that he received which led him to draft "a search warrant".
(Transcript of Trial, pg. 20)
3. Counsel for the Defendants specifically objected to the relevancy of this line of
information as to the information from confidential informants used as to probable cause in
the search warrant. (Tr. 20)
4. The Court sustained the objection and indicated from the bench that the information
used to obtain the search warrant was not relevant. (Tr. 21)
5. After the Objection was sustained, the prosecutor then immediately asked the
following question:
Q. (BYMR. LARSON) The information you received was regarding what?
A. The drug activity in the home, a previous sale. (Tr. 21, line 6)
6. At that point in time counsel for the Appellant objected and requested that a
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Motion to be made outside of the presence of the jury. (Tr. 21)
7. The Court then excused the jury and counsel for the Appellant moved for a
mistrial. The grounds stated for mistrial included the following:
A. The Count of the information concerning the distribution of drugs had been
dismissed and the prior drug sale charge was not relevant to the charges of
information which charged possession with intent to distribute.
B. The prosecutor did not have the person who made the statement and any
such information would be prejudicial hearsay.
C. The jury had heard the information concerning prior drug sale and drug
activity in the residence which is not relevant and was prejudicial.
D. The case to be presented was a circumstantial case and one of the charges
was elevated based upon alleged intent to sale which would have to be based on
circumstantial evidence because of nature of the states evidence.
E.

The jury would not be able to disregard the statement of the law

enforcement officer that there were a prior drug sale at the residence. (Tr. 22)
8. In ruling on the Motion the Court stated that the question went into subject matter
to which the Court has sustained the previous objection. However, the Court thought it was
an "inadvertent" response and indicated that the Motion to Dismiss and for mistrial was
denied at that time. The Appellant submitted that the evidence and the response required in
a new trial but, nonetheless requested a cautionary instruction before the jury returned to.
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9. After the jury returned the Court gave the following cautionary instruction:
Before beginning I want to instruct the jury to disregard any previous statement made
and if you made any note of them to strike them and forget them and the Court has
determined that the issue of the search warrant is a legal matter, and the basis for the warrant
has to do with elements of what we call probable cause and there is a legal determination and
one that I don't think you need to be concern with nor do I think it is relevant to the case that
is why I've ordered any comments regarding it to be stricken. (Tr. 25)
10. The officer described the physical evidence that he found inside the residence of
Danny and Debbie Bryan. He also described other persons present including Kyle Ovard,
Michael Bryan which is Danny and Debbie son, Ray Peterson and Chad Riley. (Tr. 27) He
testified that the Search Warrant was specifically directed to "the home of Danny and Debbie
Bryan in Spanish Fork". (Tr. 26) He testified that inside of the bedroom which he identified
as the bedroom of Danny and Debbie Bryan he found controlled substances that were not
located in the bedroom but were in the ceiling with access from the bedroom. (Tr. 30)
11. Officer Steve Adams testified that in order to get to the location were the
controlled substance were located, he had to obtain access to the attic and that he had to
reach up from the cabinet into the attic. (Tr. 34) He indicated that inside the plastic bag
methamphetamine was found in the four packages along with a pocket purse which was
offered and introduced into evidence.
12. The officer during cross examination admitted that there were controlled
substances found on other persons inside the resident other than the Appellant. (Tr. 66-79)
Also he indicated that a drug dog was brought into the resident and searched in the bedroom
of Danny and Debbie for more than one hour and no other evidence or paraphernalia was
found inside the bedroom. (Tr. 80) He indicated that he did not seize or take any documents
9

or papers in as evidence.
13. The officer testified that he found drug paraphernalia used for the consumption
by injection of drugs, but did not find any money inside the residence. (Tr. 81) He also
indicated that he believed that the resident of Danny and Debbie Bryan residence was based
upon a check of utility. (Tr. 83) The officer testified that during his search of the residence
he found syringas which were consistent with use of controlled substance.
15. The next witness was Officer Jack Topham who testified in relation to the
suspected wild life clause which is unrelated to the controlled substance investigation.
16. The State then recalled Steve Adams to the stand to identify the Owl claw
charged as a misdemeanor offense and then the State after introducing the toxicology reports
rested.
17. The counsel for the Appellant renewed the Motion for Mistrial at the close of the
State's evidence and moved to dismiss because jeopardy attached based upon the misconduct
of the State. Counsel for the Appellant noted at the conclusion of the case that the evidence
was entirely circumstantial based solely upon constructive possession in a residence of non
exclusive occupancy. The attorney for the Appellant then reviewed the evidence noting that
the States theory was based upon proximity of a room located near the attic where the drugs
were located the Appellant participation was minimal and there was more incriminating
evidence against the other occupants some of whom had possession of syringes. (Tr. 124)
18. The Court took the Motion under advisement and did not rule upon it. (Tr. 127)
The Appellant then renewed the Motion for Mistrial based upon the inadmissible statement
10

about a drug transaction in light of the purely circumstantial evidence of constructed
possession. (Tr. 127) The Court indicated in denying the Motion for Mistrial based upon the
statement noting the Court was surprised by the answer which was received. (Tr. 129)
19. Then, Debbie Bryan took the stand and she testified that she was a resident of
88 North 700 East, Spanish Fork, Utah, and that other persons were present in the residence.
She also testified that she was not aware of the controlled substances that were located in the
attic area near her bedroom. (Tr. 150)
20. After the jury was excused for deliberations, the Appellant renewed the Motion
for New Trial and Mistrial based upon the prosecutorial error that occurred during trial
because of the mention of drug dealing. Counsel added to the Motion the fact that during
the closing arguments counsel for the State made two prejudiced remarks that were related
to the incident. First, the prosecutor referred to the residence during the closing argument
as "drug house". Secondly, in the final argument counsel for the defense noted that the
prosecutor stated that the Defendants are "drug dealers". (Tr. 188) Counsel argued that this
additional unfairly prejudicial evidence would be on the scope of argument and connected
the thread of the inflammatory prejudicial material which the State had introduced earlier
concerning drug deals at the residence. (Tr. 189)
21. The Court took the Motion under advisement until after the jury returned with a
guilty verdict. (Tr. 189)
22. After the jury returned with the verdict the Court indicated that the Courts still
had Motions under advisement and was going to continue to do that for a time pending a
11

filing of a written Motion and Memorandum. (Tr. 192)
23. The Court denied the Motion for New Trial.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT
The issues raised in this case concern the inadismissible statements which were heard
by the jury.

As set forth in detail in the brief, the comments which entered prior

acknowledging drug dealing by the primary investigating officer were inadismissible and the
Court attempted to cure the error by instructing the jury. However, as developed more fully
in this brief, the Court should have granted a Motion for New Trial because the evidence in
relation to the criminal offenses was based upon the doctrine of constructive possession and
in light of that constructive possession the evidence was harmful and prejudicial to the
Appellant.
POINT I
THE STATE WAS PREJUDICED BY THE ERROR AND PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT WHICH DENIED THE APPELLANT A FAIR TRIAL
The Appellant submits that the prejudicial effect of the error committed during the
trial must be viewed in relation to the circumstantial evidence introduced against the
Appellant. The sole evidence was from one officer and was only of proximity to controlled
substances and was without any direct evidence of nexus or direct connection to the
controlled substance.

The District Court allowed the jury consider with only an

admonishment as to the evidence from the investigating officer that a prior drug sale had
12

occurred in the residence was clearly in violation of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The
Appellant submit that the error cannot be proven as harmless in the context of the status of
the total evidence.
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that evidence of other crimes such
as a drug sale is admissible only after the Court outside of the jury find special circumstances
such as:
(1) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible
(2) To prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith.
Such evidence can only be found to be admissible for other purposes, such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident. Even then the prior crime must be proved by admissible evidence. State v.
Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, (Utah 1985)
The Courts have stated that evidence of other crimes is generally inadmissible unless
it tends to have a special relevance to a controverted issue and is introduced for a purpose
other than to show the Appellant's predisposition to criminality. State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d
738, at 741 (Utah 1985)(evidence of prior crimes presumed prejudicial and excluded absent
reason for admission other than to show criminal disposition). The general rule prohibiting
evidence that a Defendant committed other crimes was established, not because that evidence
is logically irrelevant, but because it tends to skew or corrupt the accuracy of the fact-finding
process. Indeed, "It is objectionable not because it has no appreciable probative value but
because it has too much." 1A J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 58.2, at
1212 (Tillers rev. 1983).

13

Moreover, even if evidence of other crimes is probative of a particular element of a
crime and is not offered merely to show criminal predisposition, such evidence is not
automatically admissible under Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 10 J. Moore &
H. Bendix, Moore's Federal Practice, § 404.21 [2] (2d ed. 1988). Its tendency to lead the
finder of fact to an improper basis for decision must still be balanced against its probative
value and the need for such evidence in proving a particular issue. In this case, the State has
not contended that the evidence presented to the Jury was relevant to establish a material
fact. Consequently, the evidence sought to be elicited was totally irrelevant, and, therefore,
should not have been admitted or even an attempt made to admit the evidence See Utah
Rules of Evidence 401 which sets forth definition of relevant evidence. The issuance and
grounds for the issuance of the search warrant was not relevant except to establish the
grounds why law enforcement were present at the residence.
In Moore v. United States, 429 U.S. 20 (1976) the United States Supreme Court
addressed the issue of out-of-court statements used to explain police conduct. In that case,
the Court held that testimony by a police officer that an unidentified informant had told him
that Moore and others had heroin at "Moore's apartment" was inadmissible hearsay.
Although the Appellant was found at the apartment and heroin was also found there, the
Court ruled that the trial court had relied expressly on the informant's statement in finding
the Appellant guilty of possession of heroin. Because the informant was unidentified, he
could not be cross-examined as to the basis of his belief that Moore was a tenant or regular
resident of the apartment. The Court ruled the statement inadmissible hearsay on the issue
14

of guilt and remanded the case for a determination of whether admission of the hearsay
evidence was harmless error.

The Court ruled that an out-of-court statement of an

unidentified informant is inadmissible if it provides the single piece of information relevant
to an element of a crime, even though it also explains why the police suspected the Appellant
in the first place.
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland has ruled that if the statement of an
informant has "misleading probative force," which may explain police conduct, but is also
intended to influence the jury on the question of guilt, it is inadmissible hearsay. Purvis v.
State, Md. Ct. Spec. App., 27 Md. App. 713, 343 A.2d 898, 904 (1975).
The Courts in Pennsylvania have applied a balancing test between the need for the
circumstantial evidence and the danger of hearsay evidence being prejudicial to the
Appellant. Commonwealth v. Underwood, 500 A.2d S20 Pa Super (19S5). The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that it was reversible error for the statements of a named, but
unavailable, informant which contained specific assertions of criminal conduct, to be
admitted because they tipped the balance too far toward prejudicing the Appellant without
a sufficient showing of need for their introduction by the prosecution. See also
Commonwealth v. Paha, Pa. Supr., 555 A.2d 808, 811 (1989).
In the Palsa the informant had fled the jurisdiction and was unavailable to testify. The
trial court instructed the jury to regard these statements about drug sales as relevant only to
explain police conduct. On appeal, the court applied a balancing test "between avoiding the
dangers of hearsay testimony and the need for evidence that explains why police pursued a
15

given course of action.". The majority held that the questioned testimony contained "specific
assertions of criminal conduct by a named accused," which were likely to be understood by
the jury as proof of a necessary element of the crime and that the activities of the police
could easily have been explained without the use of the out-of-court statements. The court
reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial because the incriminating
nature of the evidence outweighed the asserted need for the evidence's other purposes.
The Prosecutor here referred to the residence during the closing argument as "drug
house". Secondly in the final argument, the attorney for the State stated that the Appellant
are drug dealers. (Tr. 188) The Courts have held that a prosecutor's comments constitute
misconduct when they call the jurors' attention to matters not proper for their consideration
and when the comments have a reasonable likelihood of prejudicing the jury by significantly
influencing its verdict. If the prejudice is such that there is a reasonable likelihood the jury
would have reached a more favorable result absent the comments a new trial must be granted
State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186 (Utah 1988). Generally, the test used for determining whether
a prosecutor's statements are improper and constitute error is whether the remarks called to
the jurors' attention matters which they would not be justified in considering in reaching a
verdict. State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992)
The error prejudiced the Appellant right to a fair trial in two aspects. First, the
Appellant claimed that the evidence did not prove a nexus to the controlled substance, and
Second, the Appellant submit that there was not sufficient evidence of possession with intent
to distribute The Appellant submit that the evidence of prior drug sales in the house owned
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by the Bryans was unfairly and materially prejudicial in light of the total circumstantial
nature of the States evidence as to nexus and possession of a controlled substance with intent
to distribute. Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, No. 971662-CA(UtahApp. 03/04/1999) InState
v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) in reversing a conviction based upon
proximity to a controlled substance, this Court discussed the significance of evidentiary
factors in constructive possession of controlled substance cases:
In this case, the trial court relied solely on circumstantial evidence to
establish that Layman constructively possessed the drugs and paraphernalia
found on Gina's person. We thus review the evidence to determine whether it
excludes all reasonable hypotheses of Layman's innocence. Even considering
the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable
to the trial court's judgment, we conclude it does not....
Conviction of possession with intent to distribute requires proof of two
elements: "(1) that Appellant knowingly and intentionally possessed a
controlled substance, and (2) that defendant intended to distribute the
controlled substance to another." State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 318 (Utah 1985)
(citing Utah Code Ann. 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii)). "possession of a controlled
substance sufficient to sustain a conviction need not be actual but may be
constructive." State v. Bingham, 732 P.2d 132, 133 (Utah 1987). "In order to
prove constructive possession, there must be a nexus between the accused and
the drug sufficient enough to allow an inference that the accused had both the
ability and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the drug." State v.
Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citation omitted). "The
sufficiency of the nexus . . . depends upon the facts and circumstances of
the case." Id. (citation omitted). Furthermore, "persons who might know of
the whereabouts of illicit drugs and who might even have access to them, but
who have no intent to obtain and use the drugs cannot be convicted of
possession." Fox, 709 P.2d at 319. "Knowledge and ability to possess do not
equal possession where there is no evidence of intent to make use of that
knowledge and ability." Id. Thus, the evidence "must raise a reasonable
inference that the defendant was engaged in a criminal enterprise and not
simply a bystander." Id. at 320.
Finally, " sufficient nexus is not established by mere 'ownership and/or
occupancy of the premises upon which the drugs found . . . especially when
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occupancy is not exclusive/" Salas, 820 P.2d at 1388 (quoting Fox, 709 P.2d at 319)
(alterations in original); see also State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 1263-64 (Utah
1983) (Durham, J., joined by Stewart and Howe, JJ., concurring separately in result);
Emile F. Short, Annotation, Conviction of Possession of Illicit Drugs Found in
Automobile of Which Defendant Was Not Sole Occupant, 57 A.L.R.3d 1319, 1323
(1974) (stating "defendant's mere presence in an automobile in which illicit drugs are
found would not, without more, sustain his conviction of possession of such drugs.").
Thus, "in order to find that the accused was in possession of drugs found in an
automobile he was not the sole occupant of, and did not have sole access to, there
must be other evidence to buttress such an inference." Salas, 820 P.2d at 1388.
Evidentiary factors "linking or tending to link an accused with drugs" include
"incriminating statements, suspicious or incriminating behavior, sale of drugs,
use of drugs, proximity of defendant to location of drugs, drugs in plain view, and
drugs on defendant's person." Id. (footnote omitted). Again, however, where the
conviction rests on circumstantial evidence alone, the evidence must be sufficient to
justify exclusion of any reasonable inference of a defendant's innocence. See State v.
Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976) ("When the only proof of presumed facts
consists of circumstantial evidence, the circumstances must reasonably preclude every
reasonable hypothesis of defendant's innocence.").(emphasis added)
Therefore the Appellant respectfully requests the Court reverse the District Court's
denial of a Motion for a New Trial. The Appellant is entitled under Utah law to a fair trial
and the error of the reference to a prior drug sale in the trial based on constructive possesion
of intent to sale prevented a fair trial.
POINT II
THE STATE PROVOKED THE MISTRIAL AND A RETRIAL IS PROHIBITED
BY UTAH CONSTITUTION ARTICLE I, SECTION 12 AND FIFTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
In deciding whether legal necessity warrants a mistrial, the Court on appeal must also
consider whether the State provoked the error which created the mistrial. Generally, if a
Appellant seeks a mistrial, he waives any defense he might otherwise assert based upon
double jeopardy, even though the prosecution or the court provoked the error. Under Utah
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law, the protection against double jeopardy bars retrial where bad faith conduct by a judge
or prosecutor is intended to provoke a mistrial so as to afford the prosecution a more
favorable opportunity to convict. State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354 (Utah 1979), Downum v.
United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963); United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976) and State
v. Trafny, 799 P.2d 704 (Utah
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, "nor shall any
person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S.
Const, amend. V. Similarly, the Utah Constitution provides, "nor shall any person be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense." Utah Const. Art. I Section(s) 12. This important
"'guarantee assures that, with certain exceptions, an individual will not be forced to endure
the strain, embarrassment, anxiety and expense of a [second] criminal trial' for the same
offense." State v. Nilson, 854 P.2d 1029 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting State v. Ambrose,
598 P.2d 354, 357 (Utah 1979). Under the Utah Constitution, the analysis does not
differentiate between the State and Federal Constitutions. State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862,
(Utah 1993).
Here, the State Prosecutor should have been aware of the result of the line of
questioning used. At the minimum, the witness should have been instructed about not
testifying about inadmissible evidence. Further the Prosecutor could have also requested a
bench conference to discuss the inflammatory evidence. The Appellant's submit the State
was responsible for the error; and; therefore, the trial court should dismissed the information
with prejudice.
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POINT III
THE APPELLANT WAS PREJUDICED BY THE ERROR AND
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT WHICH DENIED THE APPELLANT A
FAIR TRIAL
The Appellant submits that the prejudicial effect of the error committed during the
trial must be viewed in relation to the circumstantial evidence introduced against the
Appellant. The sole evidence was from one officer and was of proximity only and was
without any direct evidence of nexus or direct connection to the controlled substance. The
error of allowing the jury to hear evidence from the investigating officer that a prior drug sale
had occurred in the residence was clearly in violation of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The
Appellant submit that the error cannot be proven as harmless in the context of the state of the
evidence.
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that evidence of other crimes such
as a drug sale is admissible after the Court outside of the jury find special circumstances such
as:
(1) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible
(2) To prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith. Such evidence can only be found to be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident. Even then the prior crime must be proved by admissible evidence.
The Courts have stated that evidence of other crimes is generally inadmissible unless
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it tends to have a special relevance to a controverted issue and is introduced for a purpose
other than to show the Appellant's predisposition to criminality. State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d
738, 741 (Utah 1985)(evidence of prior crimes presumed prejudicial and excluded absent
reason for admission other than to show criminal disposition). The general rule prohibiting
evidence that a Appellant committed other crimes was established, not because that evidence
is logically irrelevant, but because it tends to skew or corrupt the accuracy of the fact-finding
process. Indeed, "It is objectionable not because it has no appreciable probative value but
because it has too much." 1A J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 58,2, at
1212 (Tillers rev, 1983).
Moreover, even if evidence of other crimes is probative of a particular element of a
crime and is not offered merely to show criminal predisposition, such evidence is not
automatically admissible under Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 10 J. Moore &
H. Bendix, Moore's Federal Practice, § 404.21 [2J (2d ed. 1988). Its tendency to lead the
finder of fact to an improper basis for decision must still be balanced against its probative
value and the need for such evidence in proving a particular issue. In this case, the State has
not contended that the evidence presented to the Jury was relevant to establish a material
fact. Consequently, the evidence sought to be elicited was totally irrelevant, and, therefore,
should not have been admitted or even an attempt made to admit the evidence See Utah
Rules of Evidence 401 which sets forth definition of relevant evidence. The issuance and
grounds for the issuance of the search warrant was not relevant except to establish the
grounds why law enforcement were present at the residence.
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In Moore v. United States, 429 U.S. 20 (1976) the United States Supreme Court
addressed the issue of out-of-court statements used to explain police conduct. In that case,
the Court held that testimony by a police officer that an unidentified informant had told him
that Moore and others had heroin at "Moore's apartment" was inadmissible hearsay.
Although the Appellant was found at the apartment and heroin was also found there, the
Court ruled that the trial court had relied expressly on the informant's statement in finding
the Appellant guilty of possession of heroin. Because the informant was unidentified, he
could not be cross-examined as to the basis of his belief that Moore was a tenant or regular
resident of the apartment. The Court ruled the statement inadmissible hearsay on the issue
of guilt and remanded the case for a determination of whether admission of the hearsay
evidence was harmless error.

The Court ruled that an out-of-court statement of an

unidentified informant is inadmissible if it provides the single piece of information relevant
to an element of a crime, even though it also explains why the police suspected the Appellant
in the first place.
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland has ruled that if the statement of an
informant has "misleading probative force," which may explain police conduct, but is also
intended to influence the jury on the question of guilt, it is inadmissible hearsay. Purvis v.
State, Md. Ct. Spec. App., 27 Md. App. 713, 343 A.2d 898, 904 (1975).
The Courts in Pennsylvania have applied a balancing test between the need for the
circumstantial evidence and the danger of hearsay evidence being prejudicial to the
Appellant. Commonwealth v. Underwood, 500 A.2d %20 Pa Super (19%5). The Pennsylvania
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Supreme Court held that it was reversible error for the statements of a named, but
unavailable, informant which contained specific assertions of criminal conduct, to be
admitted because they tipped the balance too far toward prejudicing the Appellant without
a sufficient showing of need for their introduction by the prosecution. See also
Commonwealth v. Paha, Pa. Supr., 555 A.2d 808, 811 (1989).
In the Paha the informant had fled the jurisdiction and was unavailable to testify. The
trial court instructed the jury to regard these statements about drug sales as relevant only to
explain police conduct. On appeal, the court applied a balancing test "between avoiding the
dangers of hearsay testimony and the need for evidence that explains why police pursued a
given course of action.". The majority held that the questioned testimony contained "specific
assertions of criminal conduct by a named accused," which were likely to be understood by
the jury as proof of a necessary element of the crime and that the activities of the police
could easily have been explained without the use of the out-of-court statements. The court
reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial because the incriminating
nature of the evidence outweighed the asserted need for the evidence's other purposes.
The Prosecutor here referred to the residence during the closing argument as "drug
house". Secondly in the final argument, the attorney for the State stated that the Appellant
are drug dealers. (Tr. 188) The Courts have held that a prosecutor's comments constitute
misconduct when they call the jurors' attention to matters not proper for their consideration
and when the comments have a reasonable likelihood of prejudicing the jury by significantly
influencing its verdict. If the prejudice is such that there is a reasonable likelihood the jury
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would have reached a more favorable result absent the comments a new trial must be granted
State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186 (Utah 1988). Generally, the test used for determining whether
a prosecutor's statements are improper and constitute error is whether the remarks called to
the jurors' attention matters which they would not be justified in considering in reaching a
verdict. State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992)
The error prejudiced the Appellant right to a fair trial in two aspects. First, the
Appellant claimed that the evidence did not prove a nexus to the controlled substance, and
Second, the Appellant submit that there was not sufficient evidence of possession with intent
to distribute. The Appellant submit that the evidence of prior drug sales in the house owned
by the Bryans was unfairly and materially prejudicial in light of the total circumstantial
nature of the States evidence as to nexus and possession of a controlled substance with intent
to distribute. Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, No. 971662-CA (Utah App. 03/04/1999) In State
v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) in reversing a conviction based upon
proximity to a controlled substance, the Court of Appeals discussed the significance of
evidentiary factors in constructive possession of controlled substance cases:
In this case, the trial court relied solely on circumstantial evidence to establish
that Layman constructively possessed the drugs and paraphernalia found on Gina's
person. We thus review the evidence to determine whether it excludes all reasonable
hypotheses of Layman's innocence. Even considering the evidence and all reasonable
inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the trial court's judgment, we
conclude it does not...
Conviction of possession with intent to distribute requires proof of two
elements: "(1) that defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed a controlled
substance, and (2) that defendant intended to distribute the controlled substance to
another." State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 318 (Utah 1985) (citing Utah Code Ann. 5837-8(l)(a)(ii)). "possession of a controlled substance sufficient to sustain a conviction
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need not be actual but may be constructive." State v. Bingham, 732 P.2d 132, 133
(Utah 1987). "In order to prove constructive possession, there must be a nexus
between the accused and the drug sufficient enough to allow an inference that the
accused had both the ability and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the
drug." State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citation omitted).
"The sufficiency of the nexus... depends upon the facts and circumstances of the
case." Id. (citation omitted). Furthermore, "persons who might know of the
whereabouts of illicit drugs and who might even have access to them, but who have
no intent to obtain and use the drugs cannot be convicted of possession." Fox, 709
P.2d at 319. "Knowledge and ability to possess do not equal possession where
there is no evidence of intent to make use of that knowledge and ability." Id. Thus,
the evidence "must raise a reasonable inference that the defendant was engaged in a
criminal enterprise and not simply a bystander." Id. at 320.
Finally, " sufficient nexus is not established by mere 'ownership and/or
occupancy of the premises upon which the drugs found . . . especially when
occupancy is not exclusive/ " Salas, 820 P.2d at 1388 (quoting Fox, 709 P.2d at 319)
(alterations in original); see also State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 1263-64 (Utah
1983) (Durham, J., joined by Stewart and Howe, JJ., concurring separately in result);
Emile F. Short, Annotation, Conviction of Possession of Illicit Drugs Found in
Automobile of Which Defendant Was Not Sole Occupant, 57 A.L.R.3d 1319, 1323
(1974) (stating "defendant's mere presence in an automobile in which illicit drugs are
found would not, without more, sustain his conviction of possession of such drugs.").
Thus, "in order to find that the accused was in possession of drugs found in an
automobile he was not the sole occupant of, and did not have sole access to, there
must be other evidence to buttress such an inference." Salas, 820 P.2d at 1388.
Evidentiary factors "linking or tending to link an accused with drugs" include
"incriminating statements, suspicious or incriminating behavior, sale of drugs,
use of drugs, proximity of defendant to location of drugs, drugs in plain view, and
drugs on defendant's person." Id. (footnote omitted). Again, however, where the
conviction rests on circumstantial evidence alone, the evidence must be sufficient to
justify exclusion of any reasonable inference of a defendant's innocence. See State v.
Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976) ("When the only proof of presumed facts
consists of circumstantial evidence, the circumstances must reasonably preclude every
reasonable hypothesis of defendant's innocence.").(emphasis added)
Therefore the Defendants respectfully request the Court grant a new trial. The
Defendants are entitled under Utah law to a fair trial and the error of the reference to a prior
drug sale in the Court trial prevented a fair trial.
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POINT IV
THE STATE PROVOKED THE MISTRIAL AND A RETRIAL IS PROHIBITED
BY UTAH CONSTITUTION ARTICLE I, SECTION 12 AND FIFTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
In deciding whether legal necessity warrants a mistrial, the Court must also consider
whether the State provoked the error which created the mistrial. Generally, if a Appellant
seeks a mistrial, he waives any defense he might otherwise assert based upon double
jeopardy, even though the prosecution or the court provoked the error. Under Utah law, the
protection against double jeopardy bars retrial where bad faith conduct by a judge or
prosecutor is intended to provoke a mistrial so as to afford the prosecution a more favorable
opportunity to convict. State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354 (Utah 1979), Downum v. United
States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963); United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976) and State v.
Trafny, 799 P.2d 704 (Utah 1985)
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, ,fnor shall any
person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S.
Const, amend. V. Similarly, the Utah Constitution provides, "nor shall any person be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense." Utah Const Art. I Section(s) 12. This important
"'guarantee assures that, with certain exceptions, an individual will not be forced to endure
the strain, embarrassment, anxiety and expense of a [second] criminal trial' for the same
offense." State v. Nikon, 854 P.2d 1029 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting State v. Ambrose,
598 P.2d 354, 357 (Utah 1979). Under the Utah Constitution, the analysis does not
differentiate between the State and Federal Constitutions. State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862,
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(Utah 1993).
Here, the State Prosecutor should have been aware of the result of the line of
questioning used. At the minimum, the witness should have been instructed about not
testifying about inadmissible evidence. Further the Prosecutor could have also requested a
bench conference to discuss the inflammatory evidence. The Appellant's submit the State
was responsible for the error; and; therefore, the Court should dismiss the information with
prejudice.
The State focuses on the fact that the evidence introduced before the jury by the
State through officer consisted of the brief state that the police went to Mr. and Mrs.
Ryan's home because "The drug activity in the home, a previous sale". However, the
evidence should be seen clearly as a prejudiced error when viewed in relation to the
circumstantial, constructive case introduced against the Appellant. At the close of the
evidence, the Appellant presented to the Court Motion to Dismiss based upon the fact that
no nexus was proved against the Appellant which the Court denied. The Appellant
respectfully submit that the ruling concerning the fair trial must be made in the same
context of that same evidence concerning nexus and the recent decisions of the Utah
Supreme Court and Utah Court of Appeals.

In People v. Crawford, 458 Mich 376,

(Mich. 1998) the Supreme Court of Michigan reversed a conviction of possession with
intent to distribute cocaine in which evidence of a conviction for prior drug sales had
been admitted. The Court stated that "The potential for unfairness to the Appellant in the
presentation of
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evidence of prior bad acts is "not that it is irrelevant, but, to the contrary, that using bad
acts evidence can weigh too much with the jury and . . . so overpersuade them as to
prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against
a particular charge" The Michigan Supreme Court went on to hold :
Thus, the defendant's prior conviction was mere character evidence
masquerading as evidence of "knowledge" and "intent." Because MRE
404(b) expressly prohibits the use of prior bad acts to demonstrate a
defendant's propensity to form a certain mens rea, we hold that the
trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the
defendant's prior conviction and reverse and remand the case for a new
trial... Finally, we consider whether the introduction of the defendant's prior
conviction constituted harmless error. Error requires reversal only if
it is prejudicial. People v Mateo, 453 Mich 203, 215; 551 NW2d 891
(1996). The prejudice inquiry "focuses on the nature of the error and
assesses its effect in light of the weight and strength of the untainted
evidence." Id.(emphasis added)
In the recent decision in Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, No. 971662-CA (Utah App.
03/04/1999), the Court of Appeals restated the direction of the Utah Appellate Courts in
relation to weighing the evidence in constructive possession matters. The Court stated:
The events that led to the conviction from which defendant appeals began
when the Spanish Fork Police Department received information that narcotic
were being used at a residence in Spanish Fork occupied by defendant and her
husband. A search of the residence's garbage can revealed corroborating
information including residue that later field tested positive for methamphetamine,
cocaine, and marijuana. The police obtained a search warrant for the
residence the same day and subsequently searched the home. The search
produced a roach clip, scissors, clippers, zig-zags (papers used to
roll cigarettes), and "antieue" prescription pill bottles dated from
1968 to 1978. Also found were hypodermic needles, hemostats, and a
photograph of six men, including defendant's husband, in which two of
the men were smoking a bong. The hypodermic needles were found
beneath the mattress of the bed defendant shared with her husband. All
other items were openly displayed and in plain view of the investigating
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officers. No controlled substance residue was found on any of the items
seized by investigating officers during the search.
However, "before we can uphold a conviction it must be supported by a
quantum of evidence concerning each element of the crime as charged from
which the [factfinder] may base its conclusion of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt." State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah 1980). In
addition, "[a] guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is based solely
on inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative possibilities
of guilt." State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993).
Lastly, defendant made no statements, incriminating or otherwise. We
agree with defendant's argument that the fact she lived in a house with
her husband where the items were found mis as fully explained by her
attachment to her husband as it might be by a control over the [items
seized].'" Id. at 790 (quoting State v. Ship, 524 A.2d 864, 866 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987)); see also Anderson, 668 P.2d at 1264
(Durham, J., concurring) ("f[W]here the defendant is in nonexclusive
possession of premises on which illicit [items] are found, it cannot be
inferred that he knew of the presence of such [items] and had control of
them, unless there are other incriminating statements or circumstances
tending to buttress such an inference.'") (citation omitted); State v.
Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 132 (Utah 1987) (stating mere occupancy of portion
of premises where drug is found cannot support finding of knowing and
intentional possession by accused), (emphasis added)
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
The prejudicial effect of the error committed during the trial must be viewed in
context of the lack of nexus evidence introduced against the Defendant other than
proximity. The evidence was only of joint proximity does not raise any inference which
can be used to support the nexus. In the context of this ambiguous evidence, the error
caused by the prosecution in presenting the jury with evidence oi"The drug activity in the
home, a previous sale" can only be found to be prejudicial.
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The State acknowledged the error of allowing the jury to hear evidence from the
investigating officer that a prior drug sale had occurred in the residence was clearly in
violation of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The Defendant submits that State cannot meet
the burden of convincing the Court that the error was harmless in the context of the state
evidence and respectfully requests the Court grant a new trial by reviewing the lower
Court. The error by the State of the reference to a prior drug sale in the residence of the
Defendant prevented a fair trial and should not have been admitted.
DATED this

^ / day of March, 2000.

RANDALL GAJ
Attorney for the Defendant-Appellant
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH ^asatchr01*1 ^strict n

RULING

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

= T f c ePUly

CASE NO. 971400732
DATE: May 10, 1999

vs.

JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder

DANNY DAVID BRYAN,

LAW CLERK: Dave Backman
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for a New Trial or
Dismissal. The Court, having presided over the trial,findsthat the Defendant was afforded a fair
trial. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion for a New Trial or Dismissal is denied.
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DATED this /&

day of May, 1999.
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Curtis Larson

Randy Gaither

